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This paper is an attempt to rectify some of the problems that characterize most earlier
studies that seek to explain private capital flows to developing countries or, at least, to
examine the subject from a different and complementary perspective. To accomplish
this, we propose a model framework that approaches the issue from the perspective of a
capital-exporting developed country and which also takes cognizance of developments
in other industrialized countries that could be competing with developing countries for
private capital flows. The model is operationalized and estimated with annual panel data
over 1970-2000 for 19 capital-exporting developed countries. Specifically, we estimate
equations for total private flows, FDI, total portfolio capital flows (PCF) and various
categories of PCF. We also test for the effects of a number of factors, each of which has
its own ‘push’ and ‘pull’ components. The specific explanatory factors are the level of
per capita income, interest rate, economic growth, the prevailing phase of economic
cycle, the degree of openness of the economy in the balance-of-payment capital
account, macroeconomic imbalances, and external debt burden. The empirical findings
confirm the posited effects of the ‘push’ and/or ‘pull’ component of each of the above
factors.
Keywords: private capital flows, foreign direct investment, portfolio capital flows,
export credits, developed countries, developing countries
JEL classification: F21, F34The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-468-6 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-469-4 (internet publication)1 Introduction
Attracting private capital, especially foreign direct investment (FDI), to developing
countries has recently received much attention in international policy circles. For
instance, it occupied a central place in the 2002 United Nations Summit on Finance for
Development in Monterrey. From an essentially development perspective, it had earlier
been considered the nexus of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
which states in the Development Cooperation report (OECD 2001: 20):
The time has therefore come to revisit development financing itself, to promote
an overall coherent approach where each of the following aspects will have an
important role: domestic resources; better distributed and guided expansion of
private external flows for development in partner countries, including the
poorest of them; and renewed role of development assistance, linked to
increased efficiency and adequate volume.
The report (OECD 2001: 76) continues in the same vein:
Looking at the future of development financing, the policy statement,
Partnership for Poverty Reduction: from Commitment to Implementation,
adopted at the DAC High Level Meeting in May 2000, notes that ‘it is
important that developing countries progressively rely on their own domestic
resource mobilisation, complemented increasingly by sustained long-term
private capital flows. A role of aid is to contribute to this process and to
support efforts to diminish aid dependence, particularly in those countries,
regions and sectors where access to private capital flows is still elusive or
limited.
Similarly, from a less developmental but largely financial policy perspective, FDI and
portfolio capital flows (PCF) have featured prominently in proposals for the reform of
international financial architecture (see Zedillo 2000). The reverse flows of private
capital to Latin American countries in the early 1990s, coupled with the financial crisis
in Mexico in 1994 and particularly in South-east Asia in 1997, gave impetus to this
issue of north-south private capital flows.
The central place of cross-border private capital flows has given rise to a number of
academic studies on the subject seeking to empirically determine the factors that
influence such flows. Several models of capital flows have been suggested and a
number of the empirical studies undertaken—as evidenced by the edited books that
sprang up, particularly in the wake of the East Asian crisis (e.g., Ito and Krueger 2001;
Armijo 1999; Chang et al. 2001; Edwards 2000; and Griffith-Jones et al. 2001). But
despite this, not all the issues have been addressed and many that have been addressed
are still far from being resolved.
In particular, most of the existing studies approach the matter from the perspective of
the destination or host country (i.e., the south) and thus focus mainly on ‘pull-factors’,
or characteristics of the destination countries. Related to this is the confusion that may
arise in interpreting results of a model based on host country perspective, as most
studies understand the observed effects of the pull-factors to also mean those affecting
foreign investors’ aggregate supply responses, instead of merely those factors which
affect allocation or distribution of (possibly, a given volume of) financial flows by2
northern investors to host countries in the south (see Oxfam America, 2002). Also, the
controversy still continues on the relative importance of pull- and push-factors
(i.e., source country characteristics) on north-south capital flows. Many studies have
addressed this issue (Hernandez and Rudolph 1995; Fernández-Arias 1996; Montiel and
Reinhart 1999; Agenor 1998; Mody et al. 2001, etc.). While some studies (Fernández-
Arias 1996) contend that push-factors are the major ones shaping the volume of capital
flows, others (Hernandez and Rudolf 1995) argue differently.
Thus, many issues still need to be addressed, and the present paper attempts to address
these gaps in the literature. Particularly, we propose a model framework which
identifies the effects of various pull-factors on the volume of private capital flows and
which also permits testing for the effects of various source country-specific or push-
factors as well as those relating to the generality of developed countries. The model is
then estimated with annual panel data over 1970-2000 for about 20 DAC members. We
report not only separate equations for total private flows, FDI and aggregate PCF but
also for the various PCF components. Again, this is another feature not common in most
earlier studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 highlights some stylized facts on
private capital flows while section 3 presents a critique of the mainstream model
framework and describes the framework adopted here. Operationalization of the
suggested model framework is discussed in section 4. The empirical results are given in
section 5 while section 6 presents the summary and conclusion.
2 Some stylized facts
There has been a general upward trend (in nominal US dollar terms) in the volume of
net capital flows from the developed to the developing countries in the past three
decades (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Total net flows increased from an annual average of
US$  22.28 billion in the 1970s to US$  26.36 billion in the 1980s and finally to
US$ 80.94 billion in the 1990s. FDI experienced a more rapid growth, increasing from
just US$  7.08 billion per annum in the 1970s to US$ 15.85 in the next decade and
tripled in the 1990s to achieve US$ 49.95 billion annually. On the other hand, PCF
during the same ten-year period decreased from US$ 15.20 per annum in the 1970s to
just US$ 10.51 in the 1980s before it again rose, approximately at the same pace as FDI,
in the 1990s to US$ 30.99 per year.
In relation to source country GDPs, however, total net capital flows have been
declining, from 0.51 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to just 0.24 per cent in the 1980s
before rising modestly to 0.39 per cent in the 1990s. But the FDI component actually
recorded an upward trend to attain 0.24 per cent in the 1990s, after falling from 0.16 per
cent of GDP in the 1970s to 0.14 per cent in the 1980s. PCF fell drastically from 0.35
per cent of GDP in the 1970s to a measly 0.09 per cent in the 1980s but compensated in
the 1990s for some of this decline by rising to 0.15 per cent of GDP. Thus, private
capital flows in relation to GDP were the lowest in the 1980s, and this trend applies to
both FDI and PCF. Another remarkable feature of capital flows is the small magnitudes
involved. After taking into account reverse transfers in the form of interest payments3
Table 1
Sources and volatility of foreign net capital flows to developing countries, 1970-2000
 (transition countries excluded)
Foreign direct Volatility index (coefficient 















Amount (annual average, US$ billion, current values)
Australia 0.16 -0.05 0.53 0.09 0.35 -0.49 0.07 -0.41 1.01 1.74 1.91 2.06
Belgium 0.82 0.28 0.61 0.11 0.18 0.54 0.71 0.10 0.08 4.97 1.59 9.21
Canada 0.74 0.62 3.51 0.21 0.25 3.48 0.53 0.38 0.03 1.20 1.47 2.49
Denmark 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.00 -0.01 1.69 1.39 4.46
Finland 0.03 0.08 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.17 1.91 1.87 2.86
France 2.53 2.35 3.61 0.36 0.82 3.07 2.17 1.53 0.54 1.09 1.14 2.13
Germany 2.10 2.88 9.84 0.78 0.97 3.32 1.31 1.91 6.52 0.91 1.03 0.91
G r e e c e ––– ––– ––– –– –
I r e l a n d ––– ––– ––– –– –
Italy 1.34 0.65 3.87 0.21 0.45 0.79 1.13 0.20 3.08 1.63 1.04 1.89
Japan 2.63 5.84 10.58 0.69 3.52 5.91 1.93 2.32 4.67 1.04 0.97 1.59
Luxembourg – – – – – – – – – – – –
Netherlands 0.60 0.42 3.86 0.24 0.41 3.19 0.36 0.00 0.66 1.30 1.51 1.95
New Zealand 0.01 0.03 – 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 – 0.93 0.83 1.46
Norway 0.13 -0.01 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.11 -0.03 0.07 1.47 1.70 2.27
Portugal – – 0.93 – – 0.85 – – 0.08 1.71 1.69 3.06
Spain – 0.11 7.24 – 0.20 7.32 – -0.09 -0.08 1.99 2.06 5.15
Sweden 0.30 0.38 0.63 0.08 0.15 0.39 0.22 0.23 0.24 1.07 1.34 1.43
Switzerland 1.18 1.16 0.64 0.18 0.74 0.89 1.00 0.42 -0.25 1.66 1.91 2.96
UK 4.52 3.52 8.45 0.77 2.67 6.62 3.75 0.85 1.83 0.84 1.00 1.65
USA 5.06 7.54 33.94 3.29 4.98 20.70 1.77 2.56 13.24 1.17 0.92 1.88
Total* 22.28 26.36 80.94 7.08 15.85 49.95 15.20 10.51 30.99 1.57 1.41 2.74
Austria 0.14 0.23 -0.16 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.22 -0.22 na na na
Australia 0.38 -0.05 0.26 0.22 0.36 -0.24 0.16 -0.42 0.50 na na na
Belgium 1.23 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.22 1.07 0.08 0.03 na na na
Canada 0.43 0.16 0.59 0.12 0.06 0.58 0.31 0.09 0.00 na na na
Denmark 0.35 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.01 -0.01 na na na
Finland 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.14 na na na
France 0.70 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.60 0.20 0.04 na na na
Germany 0.40 0.28 0.47 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.31 na na na
G r e e c e ––– ––– ––– n a n an a
Ireland – – – – – – – – – na na na
Italy 0.59 0.10 0.34 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.50 0.03 0.27 na na na
Japan 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.11 na na na
Luxembourg – – – – – – – – – na na na
Netherlands 0.62 0.22 1.05 0.25 0.22 0.87 0.37 0.00 0.18 na na na
New Zealand 0.06 0.10 – 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 – na na na
Norway 0.40 -0.01 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.35 -0.04 0.05 na na na
Portugal – – 0.92 – – 0.84 – – 0.08 na na na
Spain – 0.04 1.28 – 0.07 1.29 – -0.03 -0.01 na na na
Sweden 0.41 0.26 0.27 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.31 0.16 0.10 na na na
Switzerland 1.98 0.83 0.25 0.30 0.53 0.34 1.67 0.30 -0.10 na na na
UK 1.78 0.56 0.71 0.30 0.43 0.55 1.48 0.14 0.15 na na na
USA 0.29 0.17 0.44 0.19 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.06 0.17 na na na
Total 0.51 0.24 0.39 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.09 0.15 na na na
Notes:          * The numbers for the volatility index are averages (and not totals) across the 18 countries.
 (Australia's figure is excluded, being an outlier);
– = non-availability of data;
na = non-applicable.
Source: Computed  from DAC (online) and  World Bank's GDP figures from International Development
Statistics.4
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%  of total private flows Amount (US$ billion, annual average)
Total private flows 37.45    34.65    163.05    100.00    100.00    100.00   
FDI 11.46    26.13    102.64    30.61    75.43    62.95   
Portfolio capital: total 25.99    8.51    60.41    69.39    24.57    37.05   
Portfolio capital: banks – – 23.74    – – 14.56   
of which: banks' net export credits – – 0.37    – – 0.22   
Portfolio capital: non-banks – – 35.48    – – 21.76   
of which: Non-banks' net export credits 7.63    0.98    3.39    20.36    2.81    2.08   
of which: Non-banks' securities & other 1.24    4.26    31.66    3.31    12.30    19.42   
Memo:  Net export credits (total)  8.48    0.81    3.75    22.64    2.33    2.30   
% of source % of destination
countries' GDP 
Total private flows 0.54    0.22    0.71    1.76    0.95    2.44   
FDI 0.17    0.17    0.45    0.54    0.72    1.54   
Portfolio capital: total 0.38    0.05    0.26    1.22    0.23    0.90   
Portfolio capital: banks – – 0.10    – – 0.36   
of which: banks' net export credits – – 0.00    – – 0.01   
Portfolio capital: non-banks – – 0.15    – – 0.53   
of which: Non-banks' net export credits 0.11    0.01    0.01    0.36    0.03    0.05   
of which: Non-banks' securities & other 0.02    0.03    0.14    0.06    0.12    0.47   
Memo:  Net export credits (total)  0.12    0.01    0.02    0.40    0.02    0.06   
%  of total private flows
countries' GDP 
Note:  * The developing countries also include countries in transition.
Source:  Computed from the DAC (online) and the World Bank's GDP
Figures from International Development Statistics (online). 
Figure 1


























DAC (other than US) total private flows (nominal)
US total private flows (nominal)
Source: DAC’s International Development Statistics (online).5
and profit remittances, amounts would probably be about the same as official
development assistance (ODA) from the same DAC member countries. The latter
averaged close to 0.30 per cent of donor GDP for the same decades.
The composition of capital flows, particularly PCF, is shown in Table 2. While non-
bank and, hence, total export credits constituted in the 1975-84 decade a prominent
component of PCF and of total capital flows, they have since become relatively
insignificant. Instead, it is the securitized PCF that rose to prominence, particularly after
1995. As discussed above, PCF as a whole has been declining in relative importance,
dropping from 69.39 per cent of total capital flows in 1975-84 to 24.57 per cent in
1985-94 before rising relatively to 37.05 per cent during 1995-2000 period.
Table 2 shows not only the flows in relation to source country GDPs but also in relation
to the GDP of developing (or destination) countries. These accounted for 1.76 per cent
of the GDP in destination countries in 1975-84 decade, fell by about half to just 0.95 per
cent during the 1985-94 period, before rising to 2.44 per cent during the 1995-2000
period.
The trend movements in private capital flows from the US and other DAC member
countries combined are shown separately in Figure 1, confirming the statistics given in
Tables 1 and 2. In addition, Figure 1 shows that while net flows from the US are
important, they have always (except for two isolated years) been less than flows from
other developed countries combined, averaging about 70 per cent of the flows from
other developed countries, or 40 per cent of the total (which includes the US itself).
Thus, the almost exclusive attention and prominence given in the literature to flows
from the US to developing countries seems to be unwarranted.
Table 1 also confirms the general notion that PCF is more volatile than the FDI. The
coefficient of variation (a volatility indicator) is higher for PCF than for FDI for all
source countries, except Germany.
3 Model framework
3.1 The existing or received framework: modelling from the perspective
of destination countries
We start our exposition with the assumption that the developed countries are a single
composite region called the ‘north’, which constitutes the source country of financial
flows to the universe of m developing countries, collectively called the ‘south’. The
total—or envelope—of transferable resources (denoted by S) during each period from
this composite north is, by definition, the country’s excess saving over domestic
investment spending which is also the same as its (current account) balance of payments
(BOP) surplus.1 This resource envelope S is to be allocated over its portfolio of
potentially n foreign ‘assets’ or uses, as shown in Table 3. These could be net foreign
direct investment, net portfolio investment, official loans, official unrequited transfers
                                                
1 The concept of saving can be thought of as gross national income less gross national expenditure, and
before net unrequited transfers, which, in turn, are ‘below the line’ items in defining the BOP surplus
as excess of exports over imports of goods and services. This BOP definition is to include grants
(official unrequited transfers) in the north-south financial flows.6
or grants, private unrequited transfers, autonomous reduction in foreign reserves held by
developing countries, etc. We denote the amount allocated to each type i by Fi
(i = 1, … n). Also, for each category of use, the source country has to decide on its
allocation among m potential destination countries, each of which receives Sj (j = 1, …
m) in the form of a combination of n ‘assets’. Ignoring the intra-destination countries’
financial flows (which in real life are relatively few and small in amounts), the (current
account) BOP deficit of each destination country j is the column total (yij = Sj) for that
country. The resulting m by n matrix of uses and destinations is shown in Table 3,
which, therefore, constitutes a very disaggregated (mainly) capital account section of
BOP record for the composite capital-exporting country. The relationship between the
transferable resource envelope S and its uses is shown in equation (1) below, which is,























Previous econometric studies typically seek to explain, from the perspective of the
south, the variation in just a single element yij of the above matrix, i.e., net inflow to a
given recipient country over time (or across countries at a point in time) of a particular
category like foreign direct investment, portfolio investment or foreign aid. The typical
equation specified, assuming a time-series approach, in the most elaborate studies takes
the form:
yijt = f(xjt, Zt)      (i =  1, 2, …n; j = 1, … m; t = 1, … T)( 2 )
where:
yijt = net financial inflow of type i that is being explained (say, portfolio investment)
to the destination country j in period t;
xjt = a representative element of the vector of specific characteristics or factors
relating to the destination country j during period t, which are popularly referred to as
the pull-factors in such studies; and
Zt = a representative element of the vector of specific characteristics or factors
relating to the international community, especially the source country (the north) at
time t, which are popularly called the push-factors.
If the xj is found to have a negative causal effect on yij, the inference would be that high
value of xj deters foreign financial inflow of type i to country j, so that policies aimed at
attracting yi to country j should aim at reducing that particular factor. The reverse holds
if that factor is found to have a positive causal effect on yij.
This type of econometric analysis can highlight much about certain types of foreign
financial allocation policies. For instance, it is sometimes desirable to target a given
volume of north-south financial flows to a particular country j, in the form of a specific
productive type i (like, say, foreign direct investment), irrespective of how this
increased allocation is financed and whether any additionality exists. From this type of
analysis, one can infer whether the pull-factor xj has the effect of bringing this about.
This would be satisfactory if the manner of financing the resulting increase in yij (or
utilization of its induced decrease, if that is the case) is of no concern.7
Table 3
Hypothetical disaggregated balance of payments (BOP) capital accounts for the developed country
Destination country
12 … m
Total for each type
 of resource transfer
Financial asset:
1 (say, FDI) y11 y12 … y1m y1j = F1
2 (say, portfolio investment) y21 y22 … y2m y2j = F2



















n (say, decrease in foreign
reserve holdings by destination
countries)
yn1 yn2 … ynm ynj = Fn
Total transfers to (or BOP deficit
for) each destination country
yi1 = S1 yi2 = S2 … yim = Sm yij =
Fi  =  Sj
But this popular approach can also be defective or error-prone in addressing other forms
of allocation policies while it can fail woefully when it comes to additionality or
crowding-out issues. The pull-factor induced increase in yij (i.e., xj-induced) could have
been at the expense of any combination of the remaining nm-1 entries or cells of yκτ ’s
(κ  = 1, … -1; τ  = 1, … m-1; ∀  κ  ≠  i and τ  ≠  j) given in Table 3. In other words, it could
have been financed by reducing other forms of inflow (i.e., some other elements of Sj,
other than yij) to that particular country, as would have been the case if the increased FDI
is partially or wholly financed by a corresponding decrease in foreign portfolio capital. It
also means that the xj-induced increase in yij could have been at the expense of a reduction
in foreign resource flows (whether of the same type i or of any other types) to other
destination countries. The existing approach is not equipped to shed much light here.
One important policy area is the allocation of a given volume of north-south financial
flows—not to a particular country j as such, but to all or a combination of the m
destinations countries—for a particular type i (say, FDI) from a combination of other
types. This has to do with additionality or crowding-out effect of the pull-factors on a
particular type i of north-south resource flow, viewed from the perspective of the totality
of the destination countries. As a representative example of a practical and real life
situation, competing for foreign direct investment (FDI) through various fiscal or other
incentives is often said to be a zero-sum game, where net inflows gained by the country
providing the incentives equal the net inflows (of FDI and, probably, of other private
investment) lost by other destination countries. This leads to cut-throat competition in the
provision of such incentives. The approach has little light to shed on whether contentions
like these are actually true, contrary to what previous studies often appear to claim.
The pull-factors identified through such studies indicate only the elements taken into
consideration by source countries in allocating their net saving among the different types
of foreign financial resource flows or among various potential destination countries. At
best, they merely constitute the necessary conditions for changing the volume of a
particular type of foreign transfer. The reason why they are necessary conditions is that, if
the source country, in its allocation to the various types of financial flows and/or different
destination countries, is observed not to have reckoned with a particular potential pull-8
factor, then this factor can be considered irrelevant in influencing the total volume of that
specific type of financial flow to a particular country. Thus, the approach can be useful in
screening the pull-factors which need further investigation. But a more reliable
econometric approach is needed for identifying the genuine pull-factors which affect not
only the allocation of a given volume of net saving between different types of foreign
financial flows and destinations, but also entail an additionality of net financial flows. In
other words, a potential pull-factor that does not actually affect the allocation of financial
flows would also not affect the supply or total volume of such flows. But the converse is
not true because certain factors, although not affecting total supply, can affect the
allocation or ‘rationing’ of a given volume. Generally, in as much as the analysis is still
confined to the specification of equations from the perspective of destination countries,
there will be the inherent problem of conclusively inferring whether an identified pull-
factor influences the source country’s allocation decision only, or whether it also affects
its overall supply or volume behaviour.
3.2 Distinctions between modelling financial flows from the source
and destination perspectives
This distinction in the perspectives between destination and source countries needs to be
elaborated further before we describe our modelling, which is based on the latter
perspective. As already pointed out, in modelling the north-south financial flows from a
source-country perspective, equations do not need to be specified for each destination
country and, hence, for any of the nm matrix of yij or even Sj entries depicted in Table 3,
but rather for the aggregate of these. This entails specifying an equation for each financial
type i, i.e. Fi  in Table 2.2
Modelling equation for Fi is said to be from a source-country perspective. This is so
because in this type of formulation (as further described in equation (5)), the z push-factor
for individual source countries (i.e., if we relax the assumption of just a single composite
source country) should now replace what in equation (2) constitute the composite Z push-
factor for aggregate source country. Similarly, X, a composite aggregate for all the
destination countries should now replace the x pull-factor for individual destination
countries that features in equation (2). Otherwise, in principle, modelling from the
source-country perspective does not necessarily entail a difference in the type of
explanatory variables involved. But in practice, expediency often leads to testing for a
different set of explanatory variables.3
Apart from this, a difference will also arise from normalizing or scaling the statistics used
to estimate the model. Under the equation (2) format, the dependent variable is expected
to be normalized or scaled by the price level (for the value, in real terms), by the
                                                
2 Information on Fi can be obtained by aggregating yij over the m destination countries, which can be
tedious and, therefore, hardly adopted in reality. Given the manner in which statistics are normally made
available, an easier approach is to obtain the information in ‘ready made’ form from the source country,
since it is simply the source country’s transfer of type i, without concern about the receiving countries.
For instance, statistics on FDI from a particular FDI-exporting country are more readily available at
source than attempting to collate the same from several destination countries.
3 For example, information on some push-factors may now be available for each individual source country
which may not be available (or feasible to compute) in composite form for all countries in estimating
equation (2), just as some push-factors for individual destination countries in equation (2) may now
cease to be available (or practicable to compute) in composite form for all.9
population (for expressing it on a per capita basis) or by the GDP of the destination
countries. But under the source-country perspective, it would now be normalized by
similar source country indicators.4 And this introduces another serious flaw in specifying
equations from the perspective of the destination countries. In modelling cross-border
private financial flows, it is generally assumed, based on the presumption that destination
countries are being rationed somewhat, that the observed flows stand for supply (at the
initiative of investors in capital-exporting countries) as opposed to demand. Therefore
attempts are made to model the behaviour or reaction of foreign investors. The objective
is to explain (either the supply or allocation) response, effort or decision of the source
country and not to describe the resource needs or requirements of the recipients. This
means that the variables (price level, population, GDP, etc.) to be used in normalization
should be those of the source country. But this becomes difficult, and sometimes
impossible, if the destination country perspective is adopted.5
But the difference arising from scaling with the destination country variables can often be
so substantial as to seriously affect the results of the model estimates. For example, when
the normalization variable is the population, using this indicator for the recipient country
underestimates the source country’s supply, allocation or effort over time because
populations in destination countries often grow rapidly while typically the source-country
population is almost stagnant. The converse may be true with price levels. Purchasing
power parity does not always hold at every point in time—that is, if it holds at all.
Generally in the recent past as a result of macroeconomic ‘reforms’, etc., nominal rates of
foreign inflation-adjusted depreciation of domestic currency have been higher than
domestic inflation rates. This means that a given amount of foreign resource flows, when
converted into local currency and deflated by the price level, now appears larger,
spuriously suggesting that the source country has become more ‘generous’. Many
destination countries (particularly the low-income ones) have been experiencing slower
rates of real GDP expansion than the typical source country, so that using GDP as the
normalization factor would have a similar effect. This problem becomes pronounced in
cross-section and panel regression models, due to the usually great diversities among
destination countries with regard to population growth, economic growth, inflation and
currency depreciation. This problem, in conjunction with the low quality and scanty
destination country data on GDP, population, prices and even BOP (or foreign resource
receipts generally), suggests that the dependent variables in most existing studies are often
not dependable, and the results should therefore be viewed with caution.6
                                                
4 Ordinarily, if market clearing exists in international financial markets, observations on the nominal
value of each type of resource flow can be described either as transfers or receipts, just as the
observed market quantity (in the absence of rationing) can be called demand or supply. In this sense, a
researcher that describes the cup as being half-full would be equally as right as the one describing it as
half-empty. So, it is what we do with it (including whether we normalize it with variables from source
or destination countries) that determines whether we model it from the source or destination country
perspectives.
5 For instance, in practice, in equation (2), yij flow to destination country j could have come from several
source countries, so that the resulting normalization would become extremely tedious and painstaking.
Probably because of this statistical expediency, the adoption of destination country perspective (as in
equation (2)) and normalization in terms of the destination country variables have always been going
together.
6 Some of the issues here have to do with the relative attractions of using the DRS (debtor reporting
statistics) typified by World Bank publications and CRS (creditor reporting statistics) typified by the
OECD and BIS (Bank for International Settlements) publications.Table 4
Hypothetical disaggregated (BOP) capital accounts for the representative developed country k
Net resource flows from the representative developed country
k  to each  (and total) of the m developing countries
Net resource flows from the representative developed country k
to each  (and total) of the  remaining q-1 developed countries
Developing country Developed country
12 … m Total 1 2 k … q Total
Financial asset from country k
1 (say, FDI) y11k y12k … y1mk y1jk= F1k w11k w12k w1kk = 0 … w1qk w1jk = A1k
2 (say, portfolio investment) y21k y22k … y2mk y2jk= F2k w21k w22k w2kk = 0 … w2qk w2jk = A2k





































n (say, decrease in foreign reserve holdings
in country k’s currency)
yn1k yn2k … ynmk ynjk = Fnk wn1k wn2k wnkk = 0 … wnqk wnjk= Ank
Total transfers from or BOP (current
account) bilateral deficit with country k
yi1k = S1k yi2k =  S2k … yimk =  Smk yijk = Fik  = Sjk wijk= Aik
1
011
3.3 Modelling from the perspective of source countries
To further describe the source country-based framework, we relax the earlier
assumption of a single conglomerate country (called ‘north’) and replace it with the
existence of q source countries that now comprise the north.7 For a typical developed
country k (k = 1, … q), its equivalent of Table 3 matrix would now look like Table 4,
where the additional subscript k is added to indicate that the table is for the typical
developed country k. The added element of Table 4 is the inclusion of financial flows
wητ  (η  = 1, … n-1; τ  = 1, … q-1; ∀  η  ≠  i and τ  ≠  k) between the typical country k and its
other q-1 developed country counterparts (with country k’s financial flow with itself
being shown to be zero). While financial flows among developing countries are few and
often relatively negligible, this is not the case for intra-developed country flows, as their
financial markets are highly integrated. Consequently, it is desirable to recognize this
type of financial flow. So, with this assumption of many developed countries and the
new notations, the utilization of the available transferable resource envelope (Sk) at the
disposal of developed country k is described in equation (3). There, Sk is divided
between transfers to all the developing countries, given by Fik, and the transfers to all
the other q-1 developed countries, given by Aik (where Aik is the amount of financial
transfer of type i from developed country k to all other developed countries).









k ik A (3)
Aggregating equation (3) over all the q developed countries yields equation (4), which
corresponds (or should be equal in magnitude) to equation (1). By definition, the sum of
the balances between developed countries (Aik) should equal zero.
S = =
q
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k F 1 1   +0
(4)
As mentioned earlier, the model specification from the perspective of the developed or
source countries should be for the aggregate of each type of financial flow i, with the
recipient developing countries’ identity now no longer applicable. In other words,
equations (assuming time-series approach) are now to be specified for Fik so that for
each developed country k, the supply function with respect to resource flow of type i is
to be modelled,  as shown in equation (5) below, which is equivalent to the earlier
equation (2), i.e., from a recipient-country perspective.
Fik t = f(zkt, Xt)      (i =  1, 2, …n; k = 1, … q; t = 1, … T)( 5 )
where:
Fik t = net financial inflow of type i that is being examined (say, portfolio investment)
from developed country k to all developing countries combined in period t;
                                                
7  Henceforth, these are referred to as developed countries and destination countries as developing
countries, so as to avoid confusion.12
zkt = a representative element of the vector of specific factors relating to developed
country k during period t, referred to as push-factors; and
Xt = a representative element of the vector of specific factors relating to the totality
of developing countries (being measured as a composite or weighted average of the
factor for all the developing countries), so that it constitutes a vector of some sort of
composite pull-factors.
In the above formulation, the additionality (or lack of it) of the representative pull
variable X should no longer be ambiguous. If the coefficient of X is zero (in practice, if
it is statistically insignificant), it follows that the element could at best only affect the
distribution of Fik among the various recipient countries but not its total volume, so that
no additionality is involved. But if the coefficient of that element is non-zero (and,
presumably, of the expected sign), it would imply that its effect on various recipient
countries does not cancel or crowd-out each other, so that there is additionality in its
effect. It would also suggest that it does affect each of the m elements in the ith row
(i.e., in the row for Fik) in Table 5; i.e., it could be deemed to have a similar effect on
this type of flow to each of the m destination countries; consequently, there is little need
for individually estimating equations for this particular type of transfer for each
recipient country, as would have been the case in adopting a recipient-country
perspective in the model specification. Both the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the effect of that particular pull-factor in changing the volume of a specific type of
financial flow to each developing country and the collectivity of developing countries
would have been met.
As a practical illustration, let us assume that Fik stands for total FDI flows from
developed country k  (say, Japan) and that X is the composite average of economic
growth in all the developing countries. Also, let us assume that the coefficient of this
composite economic growth is statistically insignificant in the FDI flow equation for
Japan-to-developing countries. It means that even though economic growth in a
particular developing country might be a potential pull-factor on FDI flows from Japan,
this is entirely at the expense of its FDI flows to some other (presumably, non-growing)
developing country. This follows from the observation that a simultaneous or average
economic growth in all the developing countries does not affect Japan’s FDI to these
countries. But if the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, it follows that a
simultaneous growth of all developing countries would induce a net addition to Japan’s
FDI inflow to developing countries. It also implies that Japanese FDI flow to each and
every developing country is positively attracted or ‘pulled’ by the high growth
performance in that country, making it conceptually superfluous to separately test for
the effect of economic growth on Japan’s FDI flows to each and every one of the
countries.
But now if the effects of the push-factors (elements of vector Zk) are to be properly
determined, a different model specification problem has to be addressed. In equation (3)
and Table 4, the presence of intra-developed country flows are highlighted so as to
correspond to reality. It follows that there would be substitution between total financial
flows from a particular developed country k to the m developing countries on one hand
and to the rest of q-1 developed countries on the other. Thus, following from
equation  (3), the conditions in the q-1 developed countries, by affecting Aik  (net
inflow from developed country k to other developed countries combined), would also
affect  Fik (net inflow from developed country k to all developing countries), if the13
identity between fixed Sk (developed country k’s balance of payment surplus or saving-
investment balance) and Fik + Aik is to hold. This means that the push-factors in the
remaining  q-1 developed countries, by affecting Aik in the particular developed
country k, could have effects or, rather, cross-effects on financial flows from country k
to the m developing countries, i.e., in addition to the effects they would have on the
direct flows from the q-1 developed countries to developing countries. For example, the
flow from Japan of FDI (or even totality of financial flows) should depend not only on
the economic growth in developing countries (i.e., pull-factor) or even in Japan
(push-factor), but also on the economic growth in other developed countries outside
Japan (namely, USA, Germany, etc.). In other words, growth in these other developed
countries has a direct effect on their respective bilateral FDI flows to developing
countries, as well as an indirect effect through the volume of flows from Japan to the
same developing countries. This arises from the complex interrelated cross-country
flow-of-funds relationships, whereby events in one country have ripple effects on
others.
Consequently, the model specification should take note of the ripple effect, and this can
be accomplished within the framework of reduced-form equation (5) by including the
composite push-factor equivalent of developed country k’s  zk for other developed
countries, (say, Žk), as given in equation (6). This would be computed as weighted
average of the factors for the q-1 developed countries (i.e. Žk =,  h
q




1π ,where π h is






h h π , ∀  h ≠  k).8 By this,
the cross-effects of z factor in the remaining developed countries on Fik would be
controlled for in estimating the effect of zk. Except in some exceptional or rather
uncommon circumstances (e.g., degree of openness of economy, as discussed later), we
expect the coefficients of both zk and Žk to have the same sign. Using the example
above, by adding (and, hence, controlling for the ‘cross-push’ effect of) the weighted
average of economic growth in all other developed countries as an additional regressor
in the equation for the Japan-to-developing country FDI flow, the estimate of (own-
push) effect of Japan’s economic growth on its FDI flows to developing countries
would be purged of this specification bias. And if high economic growth in Japan has
the effect of, say, reducing its FDI inflows to developing countries by enhancing, for
example, profitable domestic investment opportunities, so would also be the case of
high economic growth in the remaining developed countries, as Japanese investors
would see these as more profitable outlets for their FDI vis-à-vis the developing
countries.
Fik t = f(zkt, Xt, Žkt )      (i =  1, 2, …n; k = 1, … q; t = 1, … T)( 6 )
Based on the above model description, most of the problems associated with modelling
from the recipient’s perspective have been addressed. Also, even though our discussion
has so far been based on a time-series framework, the same applies equally to panel and
cross-sectional frameworks, with one exception, however. In the case of cross-section
framework, the composite pull-factor X in equations (5) and (6) is likely to be
inapplicable since all developed countries are confronted by the same developing-
country pull-factor at each point in time.
                                                
8  The variable to use in calculating the weights π h’s is an empirical issue.14
In this study, we operationalize the above model of equation (6) type, using panel
regression framework to explain the flows of FDI and PCF from the developed to the
developing countries. The operational model employed is described in the next section.
4 Operationalization of foreign financial flow modelling from the perspective of
the source country
4.1 Model of developed-developing country flows of FDI and portfolio capital
Fernández-Arias (1996) and Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1996) proposed a
generalized equation framework for estimating capital flow equations, which has since
been adopted in subsequent studies in more specific forms. We also find this general
equation suitable for the present study.
According to Fernández-Arias (1996), three broad factors are involved in the
international portfolio allocation involving developing countries. One of these is
the expected returns on the domestic ‘project’ in a potential destination country, D; the
second is the opportunity cost represented by expected returns in the developed or
source countries, R; and the third is the creditworthiness factor of (destination) country,
C. Unlike in the conventional portfolio allocation models, the model assumes a non-
arbitrage condition for mean returns adjusted by country default risk (DC), so as to
highlight the role of the risk factor, as shown in equation (7).
DC = R (7)
Next, the functional relationships for the expected return, D, and creditworthiness, C,
are specified. F, the current flow of foreign debt (or foreign capital generally) in that
country, is posited to enter negatively in the equation for D, because it is assumed that
domestic project-returns fall as foreign capital inflows increase due to the presence of
diminishing returns. On the other hand, it is the existing or initial stock (S) of this
foreign capital that enters the C equation negatively. These are expressed as follows:
D = D(d, F),  D1 > 0 and D2 < 0, (8)
C = C(c, S), C1 > 0 and C2 < 0,  (9)
where d and c are shift parameters, with the former reflecting the underlying economic
climate regarding domestic investment returns and the latter reflecting the country’s risk
or ability to pay profile.
Through totally differentiating and then re-arranging the result of substituting equations
(8) and (9) into (7), the author arrived at the reduced-form equation (10):
F = F(d, c, R, S), F1, F2 > 0 and F3, F4 < 0  (10)
Thus, the volume of capital flows positively depends on a positive investment
climate (d) and ability to pay indicator (c) and negatively on foreign rate of return (R)
and initial stock of foreign capital or external debt (S).15
The above model by Fernández-Arias (1996) provides a good starting point for our
study. Particularly, his departure from the orthodox arbitrage condition between
domestic and foreign rates of return makes it adaptable to a development-oriented study,
as opposed to just pure financial modelling exercise. The rationale given by Fernández-
Arias (1996: 392) for the departure is as follows:
In developing countries with substantial default risk and low
creditworthiness the effect of shocks on mean returns is likely to be
relatively more significant, and therefore dominate, the effect on
variability. For these countries, first moments, as opposed to second
moments, are likely to be a sufficient good approximation to describe
changes in foreign investors’ choices between investing in these
countries or elsewhere. The standard mean-variance portfolio models
based on the trade-offs between first and second moments facing risk-
averse investors is less relevant when default risk is not negligible and
country creditworthiness is low.
What remains is the methodology for operationalizing it, particularly by finding
appropriate measures of d, c, R and S in the above relationship. We discuss this issue
next.
4.2 Measures of returns on investment and risk in destination countries,
initial debt and international rates of return
4.2.1 Initial stock of debt
As indicated in equation (10), the stock of initial debt is expected to be negatively
related to the volume of private capital flows. In the underlying structural equation
(9), this is because a high stock of debt impacts negatively on the creditworthiness
perception of investors. Although it is a pull-factor because of its relation to
destination-country characteristics, it is also influenced (as rightly argued by
Fernández-Arias (1996)), by international conditions beyond the control of individual
destination countries. Therefore, it also constitutes a push-factor.
In the study, the initial debt stock is broken down into two items: private debt, and
public and publicly guaranteed debt. High level of private debt could encourage
further (though rather involuntary) private inflows to service existing debts. This is
hardly the case with public and publicly guaranteed debts. Because of the source-
country perspective adopted in the study, we utilize the aggregate stock of each debt
category for all developing countries combined. We express each in relation to the
aggregate GDP of the same developing countries.
4.2.2 Domestic and international rates of return in the source country
This factor is also expected to have a negative relationship on capital flows to
developing countries. It is the opportunity cost of funds being invested in developing
countries. If funds are cheap in the developed countries, more funds are expected to
flow to developing countries as FDI and PCF.
Following on the source-country modelling perspective adopted here, we
simultaneously test for the effect of the two interest rates, proxied by discount rates:16
interest rate in the specific source-country being analysed and domestic interest rates
averaged over all other developed countries, except the one being examined. The
former is expected to have a negative own-effect while the latter is expected to have
negative cross-effect on capital flows to developing countries.
Similarly, we posit an anticipated economic growth (proxied by ex post growth) to
enhance returns in the specific source country being examined and consequently to
stem private flows to developing countries. A similar assumption is applied if the
source economy is in a rising phase of its economic cycle. Economic growth in the
remaining developed countries and the prevalence of a rising phase of their economic
cycle are expected to have similar cross-effects on the specific source country’s
private flows because these other developed countries will now be host to more of the
private flows that would have gone to developing countries. Anticipated economic
growth should be particularly important in view of the inclusion of FDI in our private
capital flows.
For the same reason, the level of per capita income in the source country should
influence the volume of capital flows by affecting not only private net savings—with
which net foreign flows are financed—but also by affecting returns on domestic
investment opportunities. The two produce opposite-direction effects, and the overall
impact on net private flows should be determined by an empirical study. The same
applies to the cross-effect of the level of per capita income in other developed
countries combined.
4.2.3 Returns on investments in the destination country
First, we consider the nominal rates of return on private debt flows to developing
countries. This should have a positive effect on private capital flows, especially
private debt flows. Second, we posit anticipated economic growth (proxied by actual
or ex post growth) in developing countries also to be an indicator of expected returns,
as also whether or not destination countries are going through a rising phase of
economic cycle because expected returns might be less during economic depression
than during an economic boom. The level of per capita income in the destination
countries has often been posited in earlier studies to be a positive attraction of private
capital flows, especially FDI; high income level is claimed to enhance returns on FDI.
While we also maintain essentially the same position here, we are not oblivious to the
theoretical possibility that high per capita income, by enhancing domestic net saving,
could reduce demand for foreign finance which, if not supply-constrained, could lead
to reduced private capital inflows.
4.2.4 Investment risks
Unlike the study by Fernández-Arias (1996), we do not limit our risk consideration to
just creditworthiness, narrowly defined as the ability to pay. Instead, we broaden our
concept of risk to include those elements which may, among others, impact on future
rates of return. This is necessary especially since the present study is not limited to
debt flows but also includes FDI. Also, unlike Fernández-Arias, we do not assume that
investments outside developing countries are riskless. This follows from the broader
definition of risks taken here. It is only if the risks are strictly limited to the ability to
pay as assumed by Fernández-Arias, then it might be in order to assume absence of
investment risks in the source countries.17
One risk indicator we recognize here is the macroeconomic environment, particularly
macroeconomic instability (alternatively proxied by inflation rate and monetary
growth). This affects not only future repayment possibility (in the case of debts) but
also the risks surrounding expected returns. We expect high inflation rate (or
monetary growth) in the domestic economy of the specific source country under
consideration to discourage domestic investment locally and thereby lead to enhanced
capital flows to developing countries, just as the cross-effect of high inflation (or
monetary growth) in other developed countries. High inflation (or monetary growth)
in destination countries should have an opposite effect of retarding the volume of
private capital flows received from developed countries.
Another indicator of risk is the existence of capital restrictions or controls (see
Montiel and Reinhart 1999). These affect the prospect of capital repatriation, profit
remittance, etc. The existence of capital controls in destination countries should have
an unambiguous effect of reducing the volumes of private flows received. The effect
of the existence of capital controls in a source country should similarly reduce capital
flows to the destination countries. By reducing capital inflow and outflows to other
countries, net inflows to developing countries can hardly be unaffected negatively.
But the cross-effect of capital controls in other industrialized countries should,
instead, have a positive effect on the flow from the particular source country under
consideration to developing countries because the alternative of going to these other
developed countries would be less attractive now. Instead of using qualitative capital
control indicators as Montiel and Reinhart (1999) do, we proxy the lack of capital
controls by the degree of openness in the balance-of-payments capital account,
measured as the sum of private inflows and outflows in relation to the GDP.
4.3 Specific model specification adopted in the study
We specify a regression equation of the form given in equation (6), reproduced as
equation (11):
Fik t = f(zkt, Xt, Žkt )      (i =  1, 2, … n; k = 1, … q; t = 1, … T) (11)
where:
Fikt is the flow of ith type of private capital from source (developed) country k during
year t to developing (destination) countries. Equations are estimated for different
types and combinations of private capital flows, namely, total private capital flow;
FDI; and PCF, with the latter decomposed, as determined by data availability, into
non-bank PCF, non-bank securities, total export credit, and non-export credit;
zkt  is the vector of source country k’s specific or push-factors that make local
investors seek cross-border investment opportunities (or desist from doing so, as the
case may be);
Žkt is the average of corresponding elements of zkt for all developed countries other
than country k. The cross-effects of Žkt on net flows from country k to the developing
countries are supposed to be broadly the same as those of zkt (with the exception of
the degree of openness of capital account), as already explained. Every element of18
this vector is in aggregate form, being a weighted average for all developed countries
except the one under consideration;
Xt is the vector of destination (developing) countries’ specific or pull-factors that
attract or repel private capital flows from the developed countries. Every element of
this vector is in aggregate form, being a weighted average for all developing
countries.
Although not explicitly indicated, the above specification is for estimation with time-
series data that are pooled across the countries to form a panel data. Specifically, annual
data over 1970 to 2000 period are pooled across the 19 donor countries with private
capital flow statistics in Table 1.9 But the resulting panel data are unbalanced in the
sense that there are missing values for countries in a non-uniform manner with respect
to both countries and variables. Also, because of this unbalanced nature of the data and
due to the fact that some of the explanatory variables (e.g., inflation and monetary
growth) are alternative proxies for essentially the same factor, we include only a few
variables at a time. By doing so, not only is the incidence of multicollinearity
minimized, but also the number of observations available to estimate the equation with
fewer variables is maximized, as the inclusion of all or most explanatory variables in a
particular equation would drastically reduce the usable data points. For each variable
included for the source country, we also include the corresponding aggregate for all
other source countries combined as well as for the destination countries. We employ a
fixed-effect method that permits the intercept to vary across countries in the derivation
of the panel data estimates.10 Evidence on the existence (or lack) of stability of the
parameter estimates is obtained indirectly: as pointed out above, the various equation
estimates reported cover different periods, as dictated by data availability, with a
number of regressors (such as per capita income and interest rates) featuring in many
equations. By this, the temporal stability of parameter estimates of these regressors that
feature in many equations can be inferred.
We expect some right-hand variables, particularly, interest rates and, possibly, the
stock of external debt, to be endogenous. So, we use a form of instrumental variable
method to cater for this. The ‘instrument’ is taken to be the fitted value of interest
(discount) rate obtained by regressing the discount rate on its past value and past value
of each of money market rate, economic growth, and inflation. For the source countries,
this is done on the basis of annual time-series regression for each source country before
pooling the data and before aggregating the data into composite interest rate. But for all
the destination countries, the fitted value used as the instrument is generated by
regressing the composite interest rate on private debt to developing countries on
similarly aggregated past value of each of external debt/GDP ratio, inflation rate, and
economic growth. Concerning the private debt/GDP and public debt/GDP ratios, their
‘instruments’ are simply taken to be their respective 1-year lagged values. We take care
of any existence of heteroscedasticity with covariance matrix correction method
suggested by White (1980).
                                                
9 This means Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded.
10 The random-effect alternative also gives practically the same results. But to save space, we do not
report these.19
4.4 Data sources and how the variables are measured
Each of the dependent variables (from the DAC’s International Development
Statistics, online) referred to above is expressed as a fraction of the source country’s
GDP. Per capita income is the GDP per capita at the 1995 US dollar value; and the
phase of economic cycle is computed as the residuals generated from regressing
logarithm of real GDP index on a trend variable, so that the positive value of the
residuals represents rising phase of the cycle. Degree of openness in the capital account
is the sum of private capital inflows and outflows in relation to GDP. Public and private
debt burden of developing countries is expressed in relation to GDP. Inflation rate is the
growth of GDP implicit deflator. Domestic interest rate (obtained from IMF’s
International Financial Statistics, online) is the discount rate. All statistics, except
where otherwise indicated, are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(online) and Global Development Finance (online). All the aforementioned non-
monetary figures are pure fractions, not percentages.
Concerning the composite variables, the average interest rate on current private lending
to developing countries is available, already so computed, from the data source. The
same applies to the following other composite variables for all developing countries:
economic growth (real), degree of openness in the BOP capital account, private
debt/GDP ratio, public debt/GDP ratio, inflation rate, and monetary growth. While
similar composite variables are also similarly published for the developed (source)
countries, these could not be utilized, as we are interested in the composite for all
developed countries except one. So, we compute these ourselves from the individual
source country statistics and this requires choosing appropriate choice of weights in
aggregating and averaging across the countries. For the rate of interest, we use the sum
of exports and imports of goods and services as the weight (the sum of private capital
inflows and outflows give practically the same results but they are dropped due to
existence of missing values for some years). For per capita income, we use population
while we use GDP as weight for all others.
5 Empirical results
The empirical results are reported in Tables 5 to 10. These show that the explanatory
power of the equations is only modest, judging by the corresponding modest values of
the adjusted R2. We examine next the effects of each explanatory variable on the
different categories and combinations of foreign capital flows.20
Table 5
Effects of per capita income levels and interest rates
















































































































































































































2 0.224 0.287 0.159 0.183 0.224 0.110 0.166 0.099
Total no. of obs 553 544 538 287 515 292 531 489
Notes: The dependent variables, indicated on top of each column, are fractions of source country’s
GDP;
The numbers in parentheses are the t-values. A parameter estimate is statistically significant at
1%; 5%; and 10% levels if its t-value in absolute sense is not less than 2.6; 2.0; and 1.6,
respectively.21
Table 6
Effects of economic growth, per capita income levels and interest rates















































































































































































































































































2 0.216 0.288 0.156 0.189 0.225 0.114 0.165 0.097
Total no. of observations 553 544 538 287 516 292 532 516
Notes: See Table 5.22
Table 7
Effects of phase of economic cycle, interest rates and degree of capital account openness














































































































































































































































































2 0.218 0.296 0.166 0.250 0.221 0.192 0.171 0.121
Total no. of observations 446 441 435 210 411 215 427 413
Notes: See Table 5.23
Table 8
Effects of phase of economic cycle, degree of capital account openness and monetary expansion













































































































































































































































































2 0.204 0.282 0.158 0.215 0.193 0.195 0.126 0.124
Total no. of observations 447 441 427 210 410 215 426 394
Notes: See Table 5.24
Table 9
Effects of per capita income and inflation rates






















































































































































































































2 0.202 0.272 0.155 0.191 0.235 0.112 0.153 0.090
Total no. of observations 558 544 530 287 515 292 531 489
Notes: See Table 5.
Table 10
Effects of per capita income and initial external debt burden































































































































































Public debt stock/GDP ratio:


















Private debt stock/GDP ratio:



















2 0.234 0.302 0.172 0.234 0.265 0.116 0.178 0.098
Total no. of observations 536 528 514 275 498 280 514 474
Notes: See Table 5.25
5.1 Effects of per capita income levels
Per capita income of the specific source country: As reported in Tables 5, 6, 9 and 10,
this has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all equations (except that of
non-bank securities in Table 10) but the coefficient is statistically significant in the FDI
equation only. Since the dependent variables are expressed as fractions of the source
country’s GDP, the coefficients could plausibly take any sign. A negative coefficient
(depending on its magnitude) could mean that capital flows, in monetary terms, increase
with the source country’s income but simply do not keep up proportionally. A zero or
statistically insignificant coefficient would mean that capital flows simply rise in more
or less strict proportionality to the per capita income level, suggesting that the average
(income) propensity to invest abroad is constant. On the other hand, a positive and
statistically significant coefficient, as observed here in the case of FDI, suggests that
capital flows from the source country rise faster than the country’s per capita income so
that marginal (income) propensity to invest in developing countries is positive. Similar
evidence seems to exist for PCF and its various components, but in a weak form due to
statistical insignificance of the rather consistently positive coefficients. Thus, while
there is strong evidence that source countries’ FDI rise faster than their per capita
income levels, the evidence of this effect for PCF and its various components is rather
weak.
Per capita income (aggregate) of other developed countries: The coefficient of this is
not significant in the FDI equation nor in the equation for non-bank securities,
suggesting that a source country’s investment in these two items is largely immune from
the level of per capita income in other developed (or source) countries (see Tables 5, 6,
9 and 10). On the other hand, its coefficient is negative and statistically very significant
in the equations for all other PCF components (and the equation for total PCF, as well).
This evidence suggests that a capital-exporting developed country’s PCFs (with the
exception of non-bank security investment) to developing countries are diverted away
by rising per capita income levels in other developed countries.
Per capita income (aggregate) of the destination countries: Its coefficient is not
statistically significant in the equations for FDI (where it even has the rather implausible
negative sign) nor for non-bank securities (see Tables 5, 6, 9 and 10). On the other hand,
its coefficient is positive and statistically very significant in equations for all other
components of PCF (and the equation for total PCF also). Thus, the evidence suggests
that a rising level of per capita income in developing countries ‘pulls’ or attracts all PCF
components (except non-bank securities) but, surprisingly, no evidence of this effect is
recorded for the FDI.
5.2 Effects of interest rates
Interest rate in the specific source country under consideration: The coefficient is not
statistically significant in the equations for total and non-bank export credits and for
non-bank PCF as a whole (see Tables 5 to 7). But it is consistently negative (as
expected) and statistically significant in all FDI equations and those for the non-export
credit and the non-bank security components of total PCF, as well as those for total PCF
itself and, indeed, all private flow equations. Thus, except for export credits, all
components of private capital flows tend to be ‘pushed’ to developing countries as a
result of low interest rates in the specific capital-exporting country. This finding is in26
agreement with some earlier studies, e.g. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) who report that
interest rates in the US and Japan negatively affected the allocation of capital flows to
the selected developing countries covered in their study. Conversely, Hernandez and
Rudolph (1995), for example, find no evidence of statistically significant interest rate
effect on long-term capital flows. The short  span and a particular episode-specific
coverage of most of the earlier studies could be a likely reason for their generally
contradictory findings.
Interest rate (aggregate) in other developed countries: This exerts the same effect as the
interest rate in the specific source country, as discussed above, except that its coefficient
in the equations for non-bank and total export credits is now negative and statistically
significant. Furthermore, the statistical significance of its coefficient in the total non-
export credit and non-bank security equations is now less (see Tables 5 to 7). But on the
whole, the same broad picture also emerges here of the deterring effects of high interest
rates on private flows to developing countries, as discussed above. FDI and practically
all PCF components from a particular capital-exporting developed country are found to
be diverted away from developing countries by high interest rates in other developed
countries.
Interest rate (aggregate) on private lending to developing countries: As expected, the
coefficient of this variable is positive in all equations and also statistically significant in
all, except in some of the equations for total non-export credit and non-bank securities
(Tables 5 to 7). Thus, interest rate (as a proxy for returns on private capital flows) is a
significant pull-factor for flows to developing countries.
5.3 Effects of economic growth
Economic growth in the specific source country under consideration: The coefficient of
this factor is not statistically significant in any equation (Table 6). Hence, there is no
evidence that economic growth in the capital-exporting country in fact affects net
private capital flows.
Economic growth (aggregate) in other developed countries: The coefficient is negative
(as expected) and statistically significant in the FDI equation, with marginal
significance in the equations for both total and non-bank export credits and for the
non-bank component of PCF (Table 6). But the coefficient is statistically insignificant
in all other equations. Thus, high economic growth in other developed countries could
be said to divert each capital-exporting developed country’s FDI (and, to some extent,
the export credit component of PCF) away from developing countries while other PCF
components are hardly affected.
Economic growth (aggregate) in the destination countries: The coefficient of this factor
is not statistically significant in any equation (Table 6). Hence, there is no evidence that
economic growth in destination countries has any pull on net private capital flows.
5.4 Effects of phase of economic cycle
Phase of economic cycle prevailing in the specific source country under consideration:
The positive coefficient of the rising phase of economic cycle in the FDI equation is the
only one that is statistically significant (see Tables 7 and 8). Its coefficient in other27
equations are either significant (marginally) in only Table 8 or not significant at all in
any of the tables. Thus, what can be inferred is that the rising phase of economic cycle
in a capital-exporting developed economy appears to have ‘pushed’ FDI to developing
countries. This rather unexpected effect on FDI is probably due to the fact that net
savings—and hence domestic availability of funds—increase with an economic
upswing. But there is no evidence that PCF or any of its components is affected by the
phase of economic cycle.
Phase of (aggregate) economic cycle prevailing in other developed countries:  The
unexpectedly positive coefficient of the rising phase of economic cycle in the equation
for the non-bank security component of PCF is the only one that is statistically
significant in Tables 7 and 8. Its coefficient in other equations, while mostly positive
and significant in Table 7, is not significant in Table 8, thereby making the evidence
non-robust. The unexpectedly positive coefficient in non-bank securities equation is not
unlikely to be caused by the fact that the sudden attraction to investors (especially, since
1995 as reviewed in section 2) of this type of PCF merely coincides with the rising
phase of economic cycles in major developed countries. The total picture emerging is
that the phase of economic cycle prevailing in other developed countries does not have
much influence on the magnitude of net private flows from a particular
capital-exporting developed country.
Phase of (aggregate) economic cycle prevailing in the destination countries: The
coefficient of this variable, although broadly positive (as expected) and statistically
significant in most equations in Table 8, is not significant in Table 7, thereby making
the evidence non-robust. In totality, the picture seems to indicate that the phase of
economic cycle collectively prevailing in the developing countries does not pull foreign
private capital to them as such.
5.5 Effects of openness of the economy regarding BOP capital account
transactions
Openness in the BOP capital account of the specific source country under
consideration: The coefficient of this factor is not statistically significant in the
equations (see Tables 7 and 8). Thus, the removal of capital controls in a
capital-exporting developed country is observed not to have pushed net capital flows to
developing countries.
Openness (aggregate) in the BOP capital account of other developed countries: The
coefficient of this variable is not significant in the FDI equation. But it is negative, as
earlier posited, in the equations for total private flows and PCF, as well as for all PCF
components. It is also statistically significant in almost all these (Tables 7 and 8). This
suggests that net flows of all PCF components from a particular capital-exporting
developed country are being diverted away from developing countries as a result of the
removal of capital controls (or increased BOP capital account openness) in other
developed countries.
Openness (aggregate) in the BOP capital account of destination countries: As expected,
the coefficient of this variable is positive in all equations. And although it is not
statistically significant in the FDI ones, it is significant in almost all equations for PCF
and its components (see Tables 7 and 8). This evidence suggests that the elimination of28
capital controls by developing countries is a significant pull-factor for foreign private
flows, particularly, PCF.
5.6 Effects of unstable macroeconomic environment
Macroeconomic environment in the specific source country under consideration:
Neither of the two alternative proxies of macroeconomic imbalances, inflation rate and
monetary growth, has a coefficient that is statistically significant in any of the
equations. This suggests that resident investors in a capital-exporting country do not see
domestic macroeconomic imbalances as a major issue that would push them to invest in
developing countries. Alternatively, it is possible that macroeconomics imbalances in
each capital-exporting country were not sufficiently severe to make investors consider
them a serious disincentive.
Macroeconomic environment (aggregate) in other developed countries: In line with
expectations, the coefficients of both inflation rate and monetary growth, the two
alternative proxies for macroeconomic imbalances, are positive in all equations (see
Tables 8 and 9). Although the coefficients are rather insignificant in the equations for
FDI and some components of PCF, the broad evidence emerging is that net private
flows, especially PCF, from a particular capital-exporting developed country are
diverted to developing countries as a result of macroeconomic problems and imbalances
in other developed countries.
Macroeconomic environment (aggregate) in the destination countries: As expected, the
coefficients of the two alternative proxies of this factor, inflation rate and monetary
growth, are negative and statistically significant in practically all the equations. It can
therefore be inferred that stable macroeconomic environment, in the form of low
inflation and low monetary expansion, is an important factor that pulls or attracts
foreign private capital to developing countries.
5.7 Effects of existing level of external debt burden
The coefficient of the size of public and publicly guaranteed external debt in relation to
GDP is, as expected, negative and statistically significant in all equations (see
Table 10). Thus, foreign private investment of all categories appears to be consistently
deterred from highly indebted developing countries. Foreign private investors seem to
regard it as a high-risk indicator.
The coefficient of the size of private external debt in relation to GDP, on the other hand,
is unexpectedly positive and statistically significant in the FDI equation while in the
equations for PCF and its various components, it is not statistically significant (see
Table 10). That the coefficient is positive in the FDI equation is probably a coincidence
arising from the fact that countries with high private external debt are mostly in Latin
America and also happen to be, for different reasons, among those receiving much FDI.
Thus, on the balance of evidence, private debt seems to have little impact on net private
capital flows in general. The opposing forces (including involuntary lending to re-
finance maturing debts might neutralize the risk implied by high debt level) which could
give rise to this were discussed earlier.29
6 Summary and conclusion
The study reported in this paper is an attempt to rectify some problems that characterize
most earlier studies seeking to explain private capital flows to developing countries—or,
at least to examine the subject from a different and complementary perspective. To
accomplish this, we propose a model framework that approaches the issue from the
perspective of a capital-exporting developed country and which also takes cognizance
of developments in other developed countries that could be competing with developing
countries for private capital flows from that source. The model is operationalized and
estimated with annual panel data over 1970-2000 for 19 capital-exporting developed
countries. Specifically, we estimated equations for total private flows, FDI, total
portfolio capital flows (PCF) as well as the various categories of PCF. We tested for the
effects of a number of factors, each of which has its own push- and pull-components.
The main highlights of our findings include the following:
Effects of per capita income levels
First, while there is strong evidence that source countries’ FDIs rise faster than their per
capita income levels, the evidence of this effect on PCF and its various components is
rather weak. Second, a capital-exporting developed country’s PCF (with the exception
of non-bank security investment) is diverted from developing countries by rising per
capita income levels in other developed countries. And, third, rising level of per capita
income in the developing countries pulls or attracts all PCF components (except non-
bank securities) but, surprisingly, there is no evidence of this effect for the FDI.
Effects of interest rates
First, except for export credits, all components of private capital flows tend to be pushed
to developing countries as a result of low interest rates in the specific capital-exporting
developed country. Second, FDI and practically all PCF components from a particular
capital-exporting country are noted to veer away from developing countries as a result
of high interest rates in other developed countries. And, third, interest rate (as a proxy
for return on private capital flows) is a significant pull-factor for flows to developing
countries.
Effects of economic growth
First, there is no evidence that economic growth in the capital-exporting country truly
affects net private capital flows. Second, high economic growth in other developed
countries could be said to divert the FDI—and, to some extent, the export credit
component of PCF—of each capital-exporting developed country away from
developing countries while other PCF components are hardly affected. Finally, there is
no evidence that economic growth in destination countries has any pull on net private
capital flows.
Effects of phase of economic cycle
First, the rising phase of economic cycle in a capital-exporting developed economy
appears to have ‘pushed’ FDI to developing countries, while there is no evidence that
PCF or any of its components are affected by economic cycles. Second, the phase of
economic cycle prevailing in other developed countries did not matter much in
determining the magnitude of net private flows from a particular capital-exporting
developed country to the developing countries. Finally, the phase of economic cycle30
collectively prevailing in developing countries did not pull foreign private capital to
them as such.
Effects of openness of the economy regarding BOP capital account transactions
The removal of capital controls in a capital-exporting developed country is observed not
to have pushed net capital flows to developing countries. But net flows of all PCF
components of a particular capital-exporting developed country are being diverted away
from developing countries by the removal of capital controls (or increased BOP capital
account openness) in other developed countries. Also, elimination of capital controls by
developing countries is a significant pull-factor for foreign private flows, particularly,
PCF.
Effects of unstable macroeconomic environment
Resident investors in a capital-exporting country appear not to view domestic
macroeconomic imbalance (as alternatively proxied by high inflation and monetary
growth) as a major issue that would push them to invest in developing countries. But the
net private flows, especially PCF, of a particular capital-exporting developed country
are diverted to developing countries as a result of macroeconomic problems and
imbalances in other developed countries. Also, stable macroeconomic environment in
the form of low inflation and low monetary expansion is an important factor for
attracting foreign private capital to developing countries.
Effects of existing level of external debt burden
Foreign private investments of all categories appear to be consistently deterred from
highly indebted developing countries. Foreign private investors seem to regard severe
indebtedness as a high-risk indicator, while private debt seems to have little effect on
net private capital flows in general.
Despite measurement or data aggregation difficulties entailed by the adopted approach,
it seems to have advantages in terms of conceptual clarity and policy relevance. Our
findings corroborate those of a number of existing studies that have investigated the
pull- versus push-factors in foreign private capital flows and also go beyond this to shed
light on additional issues, including cross-effects of factors prevailing in the developed
countries other than the one being studied.
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